SCADA is the acronym for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition. SCADA may be called Human-Machine Interface (HMI) in Europe. The term refers to a large-scale, distributed measurement (and control) system. SCADA systems are used to monitor or to control chemical, physical or transport processes.

The term SCADA usually refers to a central system that monitors and controls a complete site. The bulk of the site control is actually performed automatically by a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) or by a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). Host control functions are almost always restricted to basic site over-ride or supervisory level capability.

Data acquisition begins at the RTU or PLC level and includes meter readings and equipment statuses that are communicated to the SCADA as required. Data is then compiled and formatted in such a way that a control room operator using the HMI can make appropriate supervisory decisions that may be required to over-ride normal RTU (PLC) controls. (A SCADA system includes all the pieces, HMI, controllers, I/O devices, networks, software, etc.)

SCADA systems typically implement a distributed database which contains data elements called points. A point represents a single input or output value monitored or controlled by the system. Points can be either "hard" or "soft". A hard point is representative of an actual input or output connected to the system, while a soft point represents the result of logic and math operations applied to other hard and soft points. The point values are normally stored as value-timestamp combinations; the value and the timestamp when the value was recorded or calculated. A series of value-timestamp combinations is the history of that point.

It's possible to purchase a SCADA system, or Distributed Control System (DCS) from a single supplier. It's also possible to assemble a SCADA system from components like Wonderware HMI, Allen-Bradley & GE PLCs, Ethernet communication devices, etc.

The HMI/SCADA industry was essentially born out of a need for a user friendly front-end to a control system containing programmable logic controllers (PLC). While a PLC does provide automated, pre-programmed control over a process, they are usually distributed across a plant, making it difficult to gather data from them manually. Additionally, the PLC information are usually in a crude user-unfriendly format. The HMI/SCADA gathers information from the PLCs via some form of communication method, and combines and formats the information. Since the early 1990s the role of SCADA systems in large civil engineering solutions has changed, requiring them to perform more operations automatically. A sophisticated HMI may also be linked to a database to provide instant trending, diagnostic data, scheduled maintenance procedures, logistic information, detailed schematics for a particular sensor or machine, and expert-system troubleshooting guides. Since about 1998, virtually all major PLC manufacturers have offered integrated HMI/SCADA systems, many of them using open and non-proprietary communications protocols. Numerous specialized third-party HMI/SCADA packages offering built-in compatibility with most major PLCs have also entered the market, allowing mechanical engineers, electrical engineers and technicians to configure HMIs themselves, without the need for a custom-made program written by a software developer.

SCADA solutions often have Distributed Control System (DCS) components. Use of "smart" RTUs or PLCs, which are capable of autonomously executing simple logic processes without involving the master computer, is increasing. A functional block programming language, IEC 61131-3, is frequently used to create programs which run on these RTUs and PLCs. Unlike a procedural language such as the C programming language or FORTRAN, IEC 61131-3 has minimal training requirements by virtue of resembling historic physical control arrays. This allows SCADA system engineers to perform both the design and implementation of a program to be executed on a RTU or PLC.

The three components of a SCADA system are:

The RTU connects to physical equipment, and read status data such as the open/closed status from a switch or a valve, read measurements such as pressure, flow, voltage or current. By sending signals to equipment the RTU can control equipment, such as opening or closing a switch or a valve, or setting the speed of a pump.

The RTU can read digital status data or analogue measurement data, and send out digital commands or analogue setpoints.

An important part of most SCADA implementations are alarms. An alarm is a digital status point that has either the value NORMAL or ALARM. Alarms can be created in such a way that when their requirements are met, they are activated. An example of an alarm is the "fuel tank empty" light in a car. The SCADA operator's attention is drawn to the part of the system requiring attention by the alarm. Emails and text messages are often sent along with an alarm activation alerting managers along with the SCADA operator.

The term "Master Station" refers to the servers and software responsible for communicating with the field equipment (RTUs, PLCs, etc), and then to the HMI software running on workstations in the control room, or elsewhere. In smaller SCADA systems, the master station may be composed of a single PC. In larger SCADA systems, the master station may include multiple servers, distributed software applications, and disaster recovery sites.

The SCADA system usually presents the information to the operating personnel in the form of a mimic. This means that the operator can see a representation of the plant being controlled. For example, a picture of a pump connected to a pipe can show the operator that the pump is running and how much fluid it is pumping through the pipe at the moment. The operator can then switch the pump off. The HMI software will show the flow rate of the fluid in the pipe decrease in real time.

The HMI package for the SCADA system typically includes a drawing program that the operators or system maintenance personnel use to change the way these points are represented in the interface. These representations can be as simple as an on-screen traffic light, which represents the state of an actual traffic light in the field, or as complex as a multi-projector display representing the position of all of the elevators in a skyscraper or all of the trains on a railway. Initially, more "open" platforms such as Linux were not as widely used due to the highly dynamic development environment and because a SCADA customer that was able to afford the field hardware and devices to be controlled could usually also purchase UNIX or OpenVMS licenses. Today, all major operating systems are used for both master station servers and HMI workstations.

Instead of relying on operator intervention, or master station automation, RTUs may now be required to operate on their own to control tunnel fires or perform other safety-related tasks. The master station software is required to do more analysis of data before presenting it to operators including historical analysis and analysis associated with particular industry requirements. Safety requirements are now being applied to the system as a whole and even master station software must meet stringent safety standards for some markets.

For some installations, the costs that would result from the control system failing is extremely high. Possibly even lives could be lost. Hardware for SCADA systems is generally ruggedized to withstand temperature, vibration, and voltage extremes, but in these installations reliability is enhanced by having redundant hardware and communications channels. A failing part can be quickly identified and its functionality automatically taken over by backup hardware. A failed part can often be replaced without interrupting the process. The reliability of such systems can be calculated statistically and is stated as the mean time to failure, which is a variant of mean time between failures. The calculated mean time to failure of such high reliability systems can be in the centuries.

SCADA systems have traditionally used combinations of radio and direct serial or modem connections to meet communication requirements, although Ethernet and IP over SONET is also frequently used at large sites such as railways and power stations.

This has also come under threat with some customers wanting SCADA data to travel over their pre-established corporate networks or to share the network with other applications. The legacy of the early low-bandwidth protocols remains, though. SCADA protocols are designed to be very compact and many are designed to send information to the master station only when the master station polls the RTU. Typical legacy SCADA protocols include Modbus, RP-570 and Conitel. These communication protocols are all SCADA-vendor specific. Standard protocols are IEC 60870-5-101 or 104, Profibus and DNP3. These communication protocols are standardised and recognised by all major SCADA vendors. Many of these protocols now contain extensions to operate over TCP/IP, although it is good security engineering practice to avoid connecting SCADA systems to the Internet so the attack surface is reduced.

The trend is for PLC and HMI/SCADA software to be more "mix-and-match". In the mid 1990s, the typical DAQ I/O manufacturer offered their own proprietary communications protocols over a suitable-distance carrier like RS-485. Towards the late 1990s, the shift towards open communications continued with I/O manufacturers offering support of open message structures like Modicon MODBUS over RS-485, and by 2000 most I/O makers offered completely open interfacing such as Modicon MODBUS over TCP/IP. The primary barriers of Ethernet TCP/IP's entrance into industrial automation (determinism, synchronization, protocol selection, environment suitability) are still a concern to a few extremely specialized applications, but for the vast majority of HMI/SCADA markets these barriers have been broken.

Recently, however, the very existence of SCADA based systems has come into question as they are increasingly seen as extremely vulnerable to cyberwarfare/cyberterrorism attacks. Given the mission critical nature of a large number of SCADA systems, such attacks could, in a worse case scenario, cause massive financial losses through loss of data or actual physical destruction, misuse or theft, even loss of life, either directly or indirectly. Whether such concerns will cause a move away from the use of SCADA systems for mission critical applications towards more secure architectures and configurations remains to be seen, given that at least some influential people in corporate and governmental circles believe that the benefits and lower initial costs of SCADA based systems still outweigh potential costs and risks.

SCADA using ADAM series